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    EQUILIBRIUM AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN THE ADVERSE 







Shows  equilibrium  always  exists  (Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson  model)  when  firms  enforce  policy 
exclusivity via strategic (profit-maximizing) communication of client purchases.  Strategic communication 
induces two equilibrium types: partial communication of purchase information or non-communication 
which  exhibits  a  lemon  effect  (low-risk  purchase  no  insurance).    Nonetheless,  Jaynes'  configuration 
(Jaynes; Beaudry & Poitevin) allocating both risk-types a low-coverage pooling contract and high-risk 
supplementary  expensive  coverage  always  characterizes  equilibrium  including  Perfect  Bayesian 
Equilibrium  in  Hellwig's  two-stage  framework  where  inter-firm  informational  asymmetries  impose 
additional  "competitive"  features.    Adverse  selection  induces  salient  features  of  financial  markets: 
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, latent contracts, strategic exclusivity-policy cancellation tactics, market 
institutions for sharing information.   
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JEL Classification: D82, G22, 
                                                           
1 I am  indebted to Martin F. Hellwig for several stimulating conversations.  Of course, any 
errors are my  responsibility.  Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1865367
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Introduction 
In  the  canonical  model  of  adverse-selection  insurance  (Rothschild  and  Stiglitz  (1976);  Wilson 
(1977)), insurance companies compete for consumers of unidentified risk quality by designing partial 
coverage  fixed  premium  policies.    Famously,  the  model  produces  either  no  Nash  equilibrium  or  a 
“separating equilibrium” inducing consumers to reveal their risk type by self-selecting low premium–
low coverage or high premium-high coverage policies.  In separating equilibrium, each type's policy is 
priced fairly for its risk class; high-risk types select full-coverage and low-risk types the maximum 
partial coverage leaving high-risk types indifferent to switching to the cheaper low-risk policy. 
To  screen  consumers  via  partial  coverage  policies,  insurance  companies  impose  exclusivity 
conditions restricting consumers to one policy.  Implicitly, this assumes firms share client identities to 
prohibit multiple purchases.  Jaynes (1978) showed separating equilibrium is vulnerable to a profitable 
deviation by a firm selling coverage above the high-risk fair price and not disclosing buyer identities.  
High-risk agents prefer purchasing this high price insurance plus the low-risk policy to their separating 
equilibrium  policy.    Since  issuing  high  price  policies  and  not  divulging  purchasers'  identities  is 
profitable whenever low-risk types buy insurance at a price (premium per unit coverage) below the high-
risk fair price, all policies priced below pooling odds (population average odds of a claim) lose money 
and cannot be traded.  With firms communicating client information strategically, a unique equilibrium 
is reached; firms selling pooling contracts share client identities, firms selling higher price insurance do 
not; both risk-types purchase the low-risk’s most preferred zero profit pooling contract and high-risk 
types supplement it with additional high-risk fair price insurance to reach full coverage.  By mimicking 
low-risk types, high-risk types undermine firm screening; except to firms selling high price coverage 
and not divulging client identities, a consumer's risk type remains private information. 
Hellwig (1988) reformulated the model as a two-stage game with firms simultaneously choosing 
policy  offers  and  communication  strategies  at  stage  one.    He  claimed  Jaynes'  solution  was  not  a 
sequential equilibrium of the game, therefore not Nash, because firms must condition communication 
strategies on competitors' contracts reacting to withdraw client lists from a firm innovating a particular 
deviation  from  the  proposed  equilibrium.    Then,  in  an  insightful  analysis  of  the  strategic  richness 
afforded by endogenous communication of information, he showed Jaynes' solution was a sequential 
equilibrium  for  a  four-stage  game  with  firms  choosing  communication  strategies  after  observing 
competitors' contracts.  Clouding the issue, subsequent papers analyzing a variety of adverse selection   3 
insurance and credit market models rediscovered Jaynes' solution (see e.g. Beaudry & Poitevin, 1993; 
1995;  Dubey & Geanakoplos, 2001), Gale, 1991).  Reconciling the disparate results, we show (even for 
Hellwig's two-stage frame, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium always exists and is always characterized by 
Jaynes' configuration; even when, under economically intuitive conditions, low-risk types' equilibrium 
allocation is the null contract and they purchase no insurance.  Thus, adverse selection can have a lemon 
effect driving low-risk types from the market with trade in some financial instruments (policies priced 
below high-risk fair price) not occurring.  Moreover, two-stages is sufficient to explore the strategic 
dynamics of endogenous communication and equilibrium strategies are richer than previously shown: 
adverse selection alone induces emergence of latent contracts, specific exclusivity clauses and policy 
cancellation tactics, and market institutions for sharing information.  
Preliminaries 
Hellwig’s  critique  implicitly  expands  firm  strategy  spaces  but  does  not  examine  if  the  firm 
communication strategies he considers remain optimal given the expanded strategy spaces.  They do not.  
His enlarged strategy space creates an informational asymmetry that transforms (at stage  two) what 
firms  know  about  the  history  of  previous  firm  actions  from  full  information  to  an  information  set 
containing two nodes.  Therefore, beliefs about competitors’ possibly unobserved actions affect optimal 
strategies.    Jaynes'  solution  uniquely  characterizes  the  aggregate  contract  set  in  Perfect  Bayesian 
Equilibrium.    However,  different  profiles  of  communication  and  supply  strategies  can  support  it.  
Strategic communication hybridizes equilibrium combining features of non-strategic models assuming 
multiple contracting with no firm communication (Bisin & Guaitoli, 2004; Attar & Chassagnon, 2009, 
Ales & Maziero, 2011) or exclusive contracting with complete inter-firm communication (R-S-W). 
Figure 1 depicts the Jaynes configuration.  In indemnity-premium space (α, β), with    the fair odds 
of a claim for the designated populations, the rays                              represent the loci of 
policies earning zero profit if purchased by respectively, the pooled, the low-risk, and the high-risk 
populations.  The contract p* = (       maximizes low-risk consumers' utility on the zero profit pooling 
line.  In the J* configuration (see Figure 1):  
1.         firms offer the set of pooling policies                                    and require 
exclusivity – consumers may purchase only one policy at the price 
  
  ; and no policy at a 
different price.   4 
2.  To enforce exclusivity, the n firms communicate their client lists only to firms offering (      ; 
3.          firms offer the set of policies                 No Exclusivity conditions; 
4.  These m firms do not communicate their client lists to any firm. 
5.  Low-risk consumers buy one contract p* = (      , high-risk consumers also buy p* once, then    
    supplement it with a contract H* =           taking them to full-coverage at h*. 
Only a policy attracting low-risk types alone could break the proposed equilibrium.  In Figure 1, 
consider the line hh with slope    through p* and h*.  Right of p* this budget line is the locus of 
feasible policies attainable to a consumer buying p* then purchasing additional insurance at high-risk 
fair odds      On this line from p*, high-risk agents obtain their optimal contract h*.   Now consider any 
policy γ above hh, below the low-risk indifference curve (LL) tangent to p*, and above the low-risk 
zero-profit line.  Low-risk consumers prefer such policies to p*, high-risk agents do not.
2  Furthermore, 
high-risk types prefer h* to any policy combining  γ and high-risk insurance.  The (not shown) budget 
line of slope    through γ defining the final policies available to consumers supplementing γ with high-
risk insurance is parallel to and must lie above hh.  Trading up this budget line from γ would take high-
risk agents left of hh to a best total contract also left of the high-risk indifference curve (HH) through h*.  
It follows, if some firm offering such a contract γ could prohibit its clients from purchasing pooling 
coverage on the ray 0p*, γ would only be purchased by low-risk types and earn a profit.   However, 
under the conditions specified, if a firm offered such a γ, both high and low-risk types would purchase γ 
and supplement it with a contract on 0p*.  Trading up the budget line (pp) through γ of slope    , high-risk 
consumers now reach a policy to the right of the budget line hh (possibly beyond full-coverage).  If 
necessary, they buy more insurance at price 
H q  to obtain full coverage.  The entry preventing unsold 
contracts 0p* render all γ policies unprofitable. 
Hellwig's critique alters firm strategy spaces by allowing a firm to introduce a policy innovation.  He 
assumes a firm offering the pooling contracts on 0p* (thus receiving client information from competitors 
offering  those  policies)  can  in  addition  offer  consumers  a  secret  γ  contract  on  condition  they  not 
purchase a policy on 0p*.  Armed with client lists, this firm enforces exclusivity cancelling contracts of 
clients who violate the exclusivity condition.  Low-risk agents (who prefer the exclusive contract γ) buy 
                                                           
2 Rationed at p*, high-risk types desire more coverage at price   , therefore their indifference curve 
through p* must cut hh from below implying they prefer p* to γ.   5 
it alone to avoid having it cancelled.  If high-risk types buy p* and γ, their γ contract is cancelled.  Then 
γ earns a positive profit and the pooling contract negative profit, the deviation upsets the equilibrium. 
Key to this equilibrium busting move is the assumption either the disingenuous firm's identity is 
unknown or competitors’ are unaware a γ contract is offered allowing the deviator to receive client 
information from the other firms offering pooling contracts.  If communication strategies are given (in 
the  Nash  sense  that  the  deviator  continues  to  receive  the  communications  after  offering  the  secret 
contract), the proposed equilibrium is upset.  If 0p* firms' communications  are withdrawn after the 
deviator makes its secret offer, exclusivity conditions on γ could not be enforced and it would earn a 
negative profit.  However, this requires a reactive element in firms' communication strategies because 
firms would be conditioning their communications on the contract offers made by competitors.   
To clarify his argument firm communication strategies must be reactive, Hellwig analyzed a two-
stage game using the sequential equilibrium solution concept.  At stage one, firms make binding contract 
offers and  announce  communication strategies.    At stage two, consumers choose optimal contracts, 
taking into account firms' ability to enforce exclusivity conditions.  The crucial stipulation is firms 
choose contract and communication strategies simultaneously eliminating any reactive element in the 
communication of client lists.  His definition of equilibrium required sequential rationality for both firms 
and consumers: given constellations of firm contract offers and consumer purchases; 1. No firm can 
increase its expected profit by deviating from  the given constellation of contract offers; 2. For any 
constellation of contract offers, each consumer's portfolio of contracts is utility maximizing.
3   
In this two-stage  framework,  with firms simultaneously committ ing to  their  stage 1  policy and 
communication strategies and assuming the communication strategies of  J* on page 4, the J* contract 
set and its specific communication strategies would be upset by a firm able to offer both                 
       and secretly an exclusive γ contract preferred to          by low but not high-risk consumers.
4 
                                                           
3  Firm i's two contract offers (possibly null contracts) have two components: i. Its policies; ii. Exclusivity conditions.  Its 
communication strategy identifies (for each policy) the list of firms it sends its client list.  Refer to a policy  α       as a 
primary policy and any fraction of it a derivative.  Firm i’s policy offers may be written, 




















i            
Restricting 
j
i  to equal one, offers only the primary contract.  If       
       the primary contract is divisible. 
4 There is a logical conundrum entailed in this bait and switch offer .  We discuss this in the final section of the paper.   6 
However, this result is inconclusive.  What it shows is, given the implicit change in the structure of the 
game (firm strategy sets expanded to allow secret policies and separate communication strategies per 
policy), the J contract configuration is not an equilibrium given the specified communication strategy. 
Importantly, the definition of equilibrium adopted did not require sequential rationality with respect 
to firm communication strategies, nor was this issue investigated.  Given expansion of firm strategy 
spaces,  the  specified  communication  strategy  is  not  optimal  for  firms  offering  pooling  contracts.  
Allowing a firm to offer a contract secretly, and to select different communication strategies for its 
policies significantly alters the rules of firm behavior considered in Jaynes or R-S-W.   However, if one 
firm's  strategy  set  allows  it  to  offer  secret  contracts  and  contracts  with  different  communication 
strategies this same strategy must be available to all firms, and, as importantly, all firms must be aware 
such a strategy is possible.  If at stage 1, rational firms know any firm j can prevaricate by making a 
secret offer and another offer in order to receive communications of client lists, this surely alters optimal 
firm communication strategies.  How does expansion of firm strategy sets affect optimal strategies and 
equilibrium,  how  reasonable  are  the  altered  assumptions?    The  paper's  final  section  discusses  the 
reasonableness of various modeling assumptions.  Now we focus on the first two questions. 
Competitive Equilibrium 
The two-period frame is retained taking care to maintain the assumption firms choose strategies 
simultaneously during period 1 and are unable to condition their communications on the aggregate set of 
contracts.  We use the following two-stage framework. 
  At stage-one, firms announce contract offers and communications, consumers choose optimal 
contracts taking into account exclusivity conditions and firms' ability to enforce them. 
 
  At stage two, stage one communications and consumer insurance claims are revealed, firms 
maximize expected profit exercising rights to cancel policies of clients violating contracts. 
 
At this point, we observe the terms policy and contract are used distinctively.  A policy represents a 
premium  and  indemnity.    A  contract  designates  a  policy,  if  the  policy  is  divisible,  what  (if  any) 
exclusivity clauses are attached to the policy, and the cancellation rule used to enforce exclusivity.  For 
example, a firm offering low-risk type's optimal pooling contract with a single purchase exclusivity   7 
clause might also announce it will always cancel the contract of clients who purchase another contract.  
But this cancellation strategy is neither credible nor optimal for different reasons.  It is not credible 
because the firm can cancel a policy only if it actually observes an exclusivity violation.  Since firms 
selling  the  high-risk  subprime  contracts  will  not  find  it  optimal  to  communicate  client  identities, 
consumers know the pooling contract seller cannot enforce its announced cancellation policy against 
their purchase of supplemental high-risk insurance.  Moreover, suppose this pooling contract seller did 
observe clients had violated its exclusivity condition.  A nondiscretionary cancellation strategy would 
never make sense for the simple reason a profit maximizer should only cancel contracts of clients who 
actually present claims.  Furthermore, if at stage 2 applying forward induction, a firm could infer clients' 
risk-type  from  the  contract  purchased  at  stage  1,  we  shall  see,  selective  cancellation  dominates  a 
nondiscretionary rule.  For this reason, contracts generally contain an exclusivity-cancellation strategy 
that "reserves the right" to cancel given a violation.  Firms cancel only when doing so maximizes profit. 
A firm's strategy must specify its contract offer(s) and communication rule(s).  A contract consists of 
three  components:  a  policy,  any  exclusivity  conditions  attached  to  the  policy,  and  the  cancellation 
procedures used to enforce exclusivity conditions.  A firm's communication rule for a policy designates 
which firms will receive that policy's client list.  Specifically, we assume each firm offers two contracts 
with five components to each offered contract.  For example, one strategy of a firm offering the low-risk 
optimal pooling contract and its derivatives is S
1 = (       , divisible, exclusive, cancel all exclusivity 
violators presenting claims, communicate only with firms for which every policy offer (α, β) satisfies 
 
   
  
  ; 0,0,0,0,0) with the zeros indicating no second contract is offered.  Analogously, one strategy of 
each firm offering unlimited insurance at the high-risk fair price is S
2 = (H, divisible, no exclusivity, no 
cancellation,  no communication, 0,0,0,0,0).   One strategy of a firm  offering  a secret  γ deviation  is 
described  S
3  =  ((      ,  divisible,  exclusive,  cancel  all  exclusivity  violators  presenting  claims, 
communicate only with firms for which every policy offer (α, β) satisfies 
 
   
  
  ; secret γ, indivisible, 
exclusive, cancel all exclusivity violators presenting claims, no communication).   
The possibility a firm may offer a secret γ contract significantly alters the informational structure of 
the competitive environment by introducing a  new informational asymmetry between firms.  If this 
strategy were not available at stage 1, all firms at stage 2 would know the complete history of previous 
actions.  If the strategy is available, firms at stage 2 are uncertain about the complete history of previous 
actions and face an informational set with two possibilities; in addition to the aggregate set of observable   8 
contracts, either a secret γ contract was offered or no firm offered a γ contract.  Sequential rationality of 
firm  strategies  requires  firms  respond  to  this  imperfect information  optimally, and this  requires  the 
introduction of beliefs concerning the probabilities of reaching one or the other of these alternative 
environments.  The equilibrium concept we apply is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).   
Definition of Competitive PBE: Equilibrium requires for firms a profile of contract and communication 
strategies, and beliefs π and 1-π a γ contract will (will not) be offered, and for consumers a profile of 
purchases by type satisfying three conditions.  Given the profile of contract offers, communication 
strategies, beliefs π and 1-π, and consumer purchases, 1. No firm can increase its expected profit by 
deviating from its current contract offer or communication strategy at any stage; 2. Firm beliefs are 
derived  from  Bayes'  Rule  conditioned  on  firm  strategies  and  consumer  purchases;  3.  Each 
consumer's portfolio of contracts is utility maximizing at each stage.  
Consumer sequential rationality concerns taking firms’ communication and cancellation strategies into 
account at stage one to avoid suboptimal allocations at stage two.  
Additional Assumptions 
1.  Consumers have a twice continuously differentiable strictly concave utility function u(w) 
over  income  with  Von  Neuman-Morgenstern  utility                           where 
                            d  is  the  income  loss  in  state  0,  and  i  denotes  risk  type.  
Denote  marginal  utilities  by     
           to  reference  the  relevant  income  for  evaluating 
marginal utility. 
2.  Firms selling an identical contract receive an equal proportional distribution of consumer types 
demanding the contract. 
3.  Firms are prohibited (say by law) from cancelling coverage of a traded contract arbitrarily (e.g. 
the firm must have an observed exclusivity violation. 
4.  Firm communication strategies are part of the contract with clients and are inviolable, e.g. a 
firm choosing a non-communication strategy makes a contractual promise to its clients and 
cannot sell the information.   
5.  Insurance companies only issue nonnegative policies, and until relaxed later, we assume for 
              
    
 
        
       . 
 
Condition 5 says, at their endowment income, low-risk type's marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption in the two states exceeds the pooling price implying low-risk types' most preferred pooling 
policy  has  positive coverage.   When this  assumption is  not  satisfied low-risk types' most preferred 
feasible pooling policy equals the null contract, and they only purchase insurance if a policy priced 
below pooling odds is available.  However, lemma 1 shows equilibrium cannot entail policies priced 
below pooling odds.  Nevertheless, equilibrium exists and is characterized by a special case of the J   9 
configuration.    When  condition  5  is  not  satisfied,  low-risk  types'  equilibrium  allocation  is  the  null 
contract (they purchase no insurance).  Thus, (relative to utility function's risk aversion) when risk type 
probability spreads are large and low-risk population proportion "small" and/or endowment incomes in 
the two states close, adverse selection can produce a lemon effect driving low-risk types from a market 
where trade in some financial instruments (policies priced below the high-risk fair price) does not occur.  
Lemma 1: At stage one, firms are in Bertrand-Edgeworth competition.  The only possible contract 
set supporting an equilibrium is the J configuration with unlimited, nonexclusive, non-
communicated high-risk fair policies and exclusive pooling contracts capped at low-risk 
types most preferred pooling coverage.   
Proof:  Consider  any  policy  (α,  β)  with  implicit  price 
 
   less  than  the  high-risk  fair  price.  
Whatever this price, if not rationed, high-risk types demand greater coverage than low-risk types.  
Therefore, restricting coverage to the low-risk demand point maximizes expected profit at that 
price, and no firm would offer greater coverage at the same price.  This means a firm’s best 
response can always be characterized by a price and maximum coverage.  Firms are effectively 
in Bertrand-Edgeworth competition.  Each firm may infer the lowest price (with its associated 
maximum coverage) promising nonnegative profit will prevail.  This lowest feasible price is the 
population-pooling  price.    If  a  contract  cheaper  than  the  pooling  contracts  were  part  of  an 
equilibrium, it could only earn nonnegative profit if no high-risk types buy it.  But that implies, 
its seller is enforcing an exclusivity condition and only low-risk types are purchasing this cheap 
contract (as their sole purchase).  Therefore, only the high-risk buy more expensive contracts 
implying those contracts must be the high-risk fair contracts or they would earn negative profit.  
Since  the  high-risk  are  not  buying  the  cheap  contract,  its  sellers  must  be  receiving  client 
identities  from  sellers  of  the  high-risk  contracts.    But  communication  of  high-risk  contracts 
cannot be optimal (a firm could earn positive profit by switching to non-communication and 
raising its price slightly to attract all high-risk types who could then also buy the cheap policy).  
This implies either firms selling high-risk contracts are not optimizing or the firm selling the 
cheap  contract  could  not  enforce  exclusivity  conditions,  both  contradict  the  equilibrium 
hypothesis.  Therefore, equilibrium has both risk types buying the low-risk utility maximizing 
pooling contract.  Then, low-risk types will not buy at a higher price and the only other contracts 
sellable without negative profit and immune to undercutting are high-risk fair contracts which   10 
again must optimally be non-communicated.  The only candidates for equilibrium are as claimed 
with the communication and cancellation strategies on pooling contracts to be determined.   
Now consider the possibility a firm offers a secret γ contract.  At stage 2, firms exercising cancellation 
rights  do  not  know  the  complete  history  of  stage  1  actions  with  certainty.    Instead,  each  firm's 
information set contains two nodes.  Either a secret γ contract was offered or one was not.  If a secret γ 
contract has been offered and firm i has offered a pooling contract with communication, the deviating 
firm offering the secret γ contract will receive firm i's client list allowing the deviator to enforce its 
exclusivity requirements.  Therefore, high-risk consumers (who prefer         to γ ) have bought firm 
i's pooling contract but the low-risk (preferring γ and avoiding its cancellation) have not.  Possessing no 
information allowing it to cancel pooling contracts of claimants all of whom are high-risk, firm i earns 
negative profit.  Clearly firm i's contract-communication strategy is not sequentially rational. 
Lemma 2: If belief's place  positive probability  on a secret  γ  contract  being  offered, no firm  offers 
pooling contracts with communication of client information. 
Proof:  At stage 1, firms expect a pooling contract with communication to earn zero profit with 
probability 1-π (no secret γ contract is offered) and negative profit with probability π (a secret γ 
contract is offered).  Given beliefs π > 0, expected profit is negative.  Offering pooling contracts 
with communication is not sequentially rational.  Best responses are to offer either null contracts, 
high-risk contracts without communication, or the pooling contracts without communication. 
Lemma 3:  No equilibrium has firms believing with positive probability a secret γ contract is offered. 
Proof:  By lemma 2, firm strategies have only three possibilities.   If all firms offer the null 
contract, offer of a γ contract would attract both risk types and earn negative profit.  However, all 
firms offering the null contract cannot be an equilibrium because firms would deviate with a 
profitable not communicated contract offer above the pooling price.  Moreover, if all firms offer 
contracts with no communication either they all offer the high-risk fair contracts or some offer 
those contracts while n firms each offer one-nth the low-risk optimal pooling contract (and its 
derivatives) to prevent high-risk types from purchasing more than one optimal pooling policy.  
The case with only high-risk fair contracts cannot be an equilibrium because each firm would 
have incentive to change its strategy to offer a contract between the high-risk and pooling prices 
to attract both risk types and earn positive profit.  The mix of firms offering non-communicated   11 
high-risk  contracts  and  n  firms  offering  one-nth  the  optimal  pooling  contract  without 
communication  could  not  be  an  equilibrium  because  each  of  the  n  firms  offering  pooling 
contracts without communication possesses monopolistic power and could raise its premium a 
small amount (retain its clients) and expect to earn positive profit. 
Remark 1. If firms believe with positive probability a secret γ contract will be offered, no firm will 
offer a secret γ contract.  Moreover, if firms place zero probability on a secret γ contract 
being offered, a secret γ contract is profitable only if all firms offering pooling contracts 
communicate clients. 
To  see  the  first  assertion,  note  by  Lemma  1  if  π  >  0,  no  firm  will  offer  pooling  contracts  with 
communication.  It follows no firm would offer any policy priced between the high-risk fair price and 
zero profit pooling policies and communicate clients either, because, by a revealed preference argument, 
low-risk types would also prefer an exclusive secret γ to such a contract implying the contract could 
only be sold to high risk types for negative profit.  But with no contracts offered with communication, 
any firm offering a secret γ contract will receive no client information and priced below the pooling 
price must earn negative profit because both high and low-risk types would buy γ.  Hence, π > 0 implies 
no secret γ contract would be offered.  Alternatively, if π = 0, some firms may find it sequentially 
rational to offer pooling contracts with communication.  However, a secret γ contract could earn positive 
profit only if every firm offering pooling contracts communicated clients.  Otherwise, high-risk types 
would purchase γ and a contract from some firm selling pooling contracts without communication. 
Remark 2: We conclude, from lemmas 1 and 3 and remark 1 if equilibrium exists, firm beliefs must 
place zero probability on the offer of a secret γ contract, and there must be firms offering the 
optimal  pooling  contract  and  its  derivatives  and  choosing  different  communication 
strategies. 
Definition: A communication strategy profile is symmetric if every firm offering the same set of policy 
prices  adopts  the  same  communication  strategy.    Otherwise,  a  communication  strategy 
profile is non-symmetric.   
The communication strategy profile in J* is symmetric, therefore, not sequentially rational in the 
two-stage framework allowing secret contract offers.  More generally,  
Remark 3:   If it is assumed firms can offer a fake pooling contract (it cannot actually be sold, see below) 
to receive client information and secretly offer another contract for sale, no equilibrium can 
have a symmetric strategy profile for firms offering a pooling contract.   12 
If firm strategy spaces allow offering a pooling policy as a pretense to receive client information to 
enforce exclusivity on a secret γ contract, we showed above it is not optimal for every firm selling a 
pooling contract to disclose its list of clients allowing entry of a successful secret γ deviation.  Below we 
show  there  is  a  non-symmetric  communication  strategy  profile  for  which  the  J  configuration  is  an 
equilibrium for the two-stage framework allowing secret contracts.   
Strategic Competition 
The communication strategy associated with a policy determines if a firm can actually enforce any 
exclusivity conditions attached to the policy, an attribute of signal import to consumers and firms.  For 
example, if a firm offers a policy but neither sends nor receives client information, any exclusivity 
conditions it afixes to its policy are unenforceable allowing consumers to purchase additional contracts.  
For this reason, the same policy offered with two different communication strategies (and or exclusivity 
conditions) can amount to two different contracts providing firms very different strategic possibilities.  
In this regard, Hellwig's four-stage structure revealed important observations related to his insightful 
point that sharing information involves sending and receiving information.  In addition to what and to 
whom to send information, firms must decide what to do with the information they receive.  Below we 
show the two-stage framework is sufficient for analyzing each of these points when firms' full strategy 
spaces are considered thereby enabling employment of non-symmetric communication strategies.  
If a firm deviates from the equilibrium by offering a secret γ contract, it can hardly announce its 
clients on the γ contract to its competitors.  However, although, there is no longer any question of the 
contract being secret, by adopting the strategy of offering a γ contract and communicating its clients' 
identities, this firm presents firms selling the pooling contract a decision not confronted if it had offered 
γ secretly.
5  If it receives the client list of a firm selling a  γ contract, what should a firm selling the 
pooling contract do with the information?  Since a pooling firm receiving a list of buyers of the γ 
contract could cancel the contract of any of its clients on the list, one might suppose profit maximization 
requires pooling firms cancel contracts of all violators with claims.  However, if pooling firms' strategy 
is to summarily cancel all such contracts, no high-risk type would buy γ and no low-risk consumer 
                                                           
5 One strategy of a firm offering a communicated γ deviation is S
4 = (γ, indivisible, exclusive, cancel all 
exclusivity violators presenting claims, communication with firms offering only contracts (α, β) satisfying 
 
   
  
   , 0,0,0,0,0).   13 
would purchase a pooling contract (they prefer γ).  In this case, pooling contracts would necessarily earn 
negative profit and the γ contract positive profit upsetting equilibrium.  Demonstration of equilibrium 
must therefore consider both types of γ contracts, secret (thus, not communicated) and communicated.   
Proposition 1: There exists N* such that for        and firm beliefs π = 0, the J configuration with 
non-symmetric strategies described in 1-7 below is a PBE for the two-stage frame. 
1          firms offer consumers either (not both) the pooling policy          as an indivisible 
limited  policy  or  any  derivative    
       
    for any    satisfying            .  Either purchase 
requires exclusivity – consumers may purchase only one policy at the price 
  
   and no policy at 
a different price.  Each firm reserves the right to cancel the contract of a client who violates 
the exclusivity condition. 
2.  Each of these N firms communicates its list of clients who purchase         to those firms for 
which every offered contract (α, β) satisfies  
 
   
  
   . 
  Each of these N firms promises not to communicate to any firm its list of clients who purchase a 
derivative of        . 
3.  n      firms  offer consumers choice of             )  for any    satisfying              Purchase 
requires exclusivity – consumers may purchase only one policy at the price 
  
  ; and no policy at a 
different price.  Each firm reserves the right to cancel the contract of a client who violates the 
exclusivity condition. 
4.  Each of these n firms communicates its list of clients who purchase         or a derivative to those 
firms for which every offered contract (α, β) satisfies  
 
   
  
   . 
5.  "Reserves the right to cancel" equates to, at stage 2, the N + n firms selling pooling contracts  
cancel the contract of any client who is known to have violated exclusivity conditions, presents a 
claim, and demands more pooling coverage than low-risk types. 
  6.         firms offer the set of policies                                  with no exclusivity conditions. 
7.  These m firms promise not to communicate their client lists to any firm. 
       . 
The N firms offering one-Nth derivatives of the pooling contract do not communicate client lists on 
the  derivatives,  but  do  communicate  clients  who  purchase  the  full  pooling  contract.    The  stage  1 
communication strategy of these N firms with respect to the indivisible contract         and the n firms 
offering the pooling contract and its derivatives commits firms to sending client lists only to firms 
offering contracts priced greater than or equal to the pooling contract price (this includes a firm offering   14 
a secret γ contract).  Note the only information the firm needs to announce this communication strategy 
at stage 1 is its own primary contract and unit price, and therefore the strategy is consistent with the 
firm's information set at stage 1.  The strategy is also independent of the contracts other firms choose at 
stage 1 or any other stage.  This communication strategy commits firms (at stage 1) to a specific rule for 
sharing client lists at stage 2.  Condition 5 is an important component of firm strategies.  Below, it is 
shown to be the stage 2 expected profit maximizing strategy of firms offering pooling contracts when 
firms are in receipt of both other firms' client lists and claims for payment from their own clients.  We 
note  immediately  this  cancellation  strategy  always  leads  to  cancellation  of  claimants  with  pooling 
contracts observed to have purchased any combination of pooling contracts exceeding        . 
Remark 4: The aggregate set of policies available to consumers is the J-configuration.  Furthermore, 
given this set of policy offers and communication rules, low-risk consumers buy one contract 
p* = (      , high-risk consumers also buy p* once, then supplement it with a contract H* = 
          taking them to full-coverage at h* in Figure 1.   
First, observe the N firms offering the derivative policies without communication can each offer at 
most  one-Nth  of  the  total  derivatives  purchased,  otherwise  high-risk  types  by  purchasing  enough 
derivatives would be able to exceed          and the derivatives would earn negative profit.
6  Moreover, 
since each firm would sell only one contract to any one consumer, buyers of the N contracts   
        
   
may get arbitrarily close to (       but cannot attain it because of the restriction   < 1.  Therefore, 
anyone purchasing N derivatives will obtain less coverage than          implying all consumers prefer 
the full pooling contract to purchasing any available quantity of derivatives.  Next, observe no consumer 
can  obtain  both  the  pooling  contract           and  one  of  its  derivatives.    Since  all  sellers  of 
        communicate clients, any firm selling a derivative of          will receive client information 
about  purchasers of           and  correctly inferring only high-risk types  would purchase both,  will 
cancel the contract of clients violating its exclusivity condition and turning in a claim.  Similarly, with 
sellers of          enforcing the quantity restriction by communicating clients to all sellers of pooling 
contracts, no consumer could obtain more than one full         contract.   
Both  high  and  low-risk  consumers  optimize  utility  by  purchasing         .    Only  high-risk 
consumers supplement          to full coverage by purchasing from one of the m firms selling at the 
                                                           
6 See Bisin and Guaitoli where the exogenous assumption of complete non-communication between firms 
necessitates the same one-nth supply restriction in a model of moral hazard insurance.   15 
high-risk  price.    It  follows  all  consumers  obtain  the  same  allocation  as  in  J*  and  firms  earn  zero 
expected profit. 
Remark 5:  All derivatives of         are latent policies -- not purchased in equilibrium, these latent policies 
perform  the  same  entry  preventing  role  as  in  the  J*  equilibrium.    Their  strategic  function  is 
analogous to an oligopoly pre-committing stage 1 sunk costs to credibly signal a potential entrant it 
will earn negative profit.  Observe how firm beliefs and the latent policies are mutually reinforcing.  
Firm beliefs are clearly consistent with Bayes' Rule given strategies and purchase behavior. 
We now prove Proposition 1 by showing all agents' strategies are sequentially rational; i.e. (both on 
and off the equilibrium path) consumers are maximizing utility and no firm can alter any component of 
its strategy and increase its expected profit.  This requires showing no firm could earn a positive profit 
by offering an exclusive, indivisible γ contract either as a secret offer without communication or as an 
offer with communication.     
  No firm could earn a profit by changing the price or coverage of any contract it offers. 
If one of the m firms selling at the high-risk price were to raise its price, it would lose its clients to 
its       competitors; lowering the high-risk fair price toward the pooling price would attract only 
high-risk agents and earn negative profit, moreover, these firms already supply unlimited coverage.  
Similarly, if one of the N+ n firms selling          and communicating client information were to raise 
the price on its pooling policy, it would lose its clients to one of its N+ n-1 competitors.  Furthermore, if 
one of the N + n firms communicating buyers of          both raised its price (between the pooling and 
high-risk  prices)  and  switched  to  not  communicating  and  nonexclusivity,  no  low-risk  agent  would 
purchase but it would attract high-risk agents substituting the new contract for insurance at the high-risk 
fair price.  Since the deviation would be priced below the high-risk fair price, it would earn negative 
profit.  Since low-risk types are sated at          increasing coverage at a constant price would only 
attract high-risk types and earn negative profit.  For the same reason, if one of the N firms offering 
derivatives at the pooling price changed its derivative offers to the same coverage at a higher price, it 
would attract no additional clients, and if it increased its coverage it could only attract a disproportionate 
number of high-risk agents and earn negative profit.  Clearly, any firm lowering the price of its pooling 
contracts would earn negative profit. 
  Sequential rationality of communication and exclusivity strategies 
We  now  confirm  firm  communication  and  exclusivity  strategies  are  sequentially  rational.  
Consider  the  N+  n  firms  offering  the  prime  pooling  contract.    If  one  unilaterally  dropped  its   16 
exclusivity condition, the relaxed constraint would be of no value to consumers (thus the firm) because 
continued communication of client identities would bar clients from multiple purchases of insurance at 
the  pooling  price.    If  one  of  these  N  +  n  firms  stopped  communicating  client  information,    any 
additional clients would be high risk bringing negative profit.  Similarly, dropping its  exclusivity 
condition and switching to non-communication could only gain it high-risk consumers and negative 
profit (low-risk types desiring only one policy would not switch firms).  Now consider the N firms' 
strategies with respect to their pooling derivatives.  If one of these N firms dropped exclusivity while 
retaining non-communication, it could  only  gain high-risk clients  and  negative profit.  Moreover, 
communication  gains  it  no  additional  clients.    If  it  were  to  switch  to  communication  and  non-
exclusivity,  communication  would  render  the  non-exclusivity  useless  to  consumers  because  other 
firms would use the information to void unprofitable contracts, and communication of clients would 
again gain it no additional clients.  Finally, if one of the m firms offering high-risk price coverage 
switched to communication and/or exclusivity it would lose all its clients to its m-1 competitors.   
  No secret γ offer is profitable 
Suppose a firm (including an entrant) other than one of the N firms selling the one-Nth pooling 
derivatives  deviates  from  the  equilibrium  and  at  stage  1  offers  a  secret  γ  contract  while 
simultaneously  pretending  to  offer  the  full  set  of  pooling  contracts  expecting  to  receive  client 
information from firms selling          and communicating their clients.  The communicating firms 
would sell no contracts and would send the deviating firm empty client lists.  This follows because 
both risk types maximize utility purchasing γ plus additional insurance from the N firms selling 
         
    derivatives without communicating client lists.  Since the deviator could not identify 
clients who have purchased pooling insurance from the N non-communicating firms, it could not 
cancel contracts.  Selling to both risk types at a price below the pooling price, it would earn negative 
profit.  This type of deviation is not sequentially rational. 
Alternatively,  suppose one of the  N firms  offering           with  communication  or  one-Nth  its 
derivatives without communication deviates and pretends to offer the full set of pooling contracts 
while actually offering a secret γ contract.  This firm could expect to cancel the policy of any client 
who also purchased any pooling contract from one of the n+N-1 firms offering these contracts with 
communication, but it could not identify clients who purchased a one-Nth derivative from any of the 
remaining N-1 firms selling derivatives without communicating.  Low-risk agents preferring γ to   17 
        would purchase γ but are rationed at γ.  They optimize by purchasing γ and some amount of 
pooling coverage from the remaining N-1 firms selling one-Nth derivatives and not communicating 
client  information.   Therefore,  whatever the amount of pooling coverage purchased by low-risk 
types, the deviation could earn a positive profit if high-risk types do not purchase γ.  This requires 
that after purchasing γ and supplementing it with a policy  arbitrarily close to but not including 
   
           their combined policy γ*     
   
           is left of hh for all positive λ < 1, see 
Figure 1.  With γ* left of the budget line hh through h*, by supplementing γ* with high-risk fair 
priced coverage, high-risk consumers' best total contract would also be left of hh providing less 
utility than h*.  In that case, their optimal response would be to reject γ, purchase         from one 
of the N-1+ n firms communicating such purchases, and then purchase high-risk insurance to remain 
at h* allowing γ to earn positive expected profit.  However, if N is sufficiently large (depriving the 
deviating N-firm of sufficient monopolistic power), high-risk types can purchase enough derivative 
pooling insurance from the remaining N-1 non-communicators to supplement to the right of hh from 
which they can obtain a total policy preferred to h*.  Then, the deviation earns negative profit. 
A detailed proof showing N can always be large enough to prevent a profitable secret γ deviation is 
in the appendix.  The intuition is as follows.  First observe any potentially profitable γ deviation must be 
contained within the set of policies circumscribed by the boundary p* p* in Figure 2.  Denote this set of 
policies .  It is bounded by the low-risk indifference curve through p*, the budget line hh through p*, 
and possibly a portion of the low-risk zero profit line.
7  Define   to be the larger of the two policies defined 
respectively  by  the  lower  intersection  of  the  low-risk  indifference  curve  with  hh  or  the  indifference  curve's 
intersection with the low-risk zero profit line (hence   is independent of γ).  Including its boundary, the set  
is compact with p* =         its least upper bound and   its greatest lower bound.  If a deviation γ is to 
be  profitable,  ) , (
1 * * *    
N
N 
    must  be  contained  within    so  high-risk  consumers 
supplementing γ with pooling insurance cannot reach a policy right of hh.  We now show high-risk types 
can obtain a policy right of hh for large enough N.  In Figure 2, starting from γ, high-risk consumers 
purchase pooling insurance at price 
  
    along the line parallel to 0p*.  Refer to the policy defined by the 
                                                           
7 As type probabilities converge, hh cuts indifference curve higher shrinking  . Diverging probabilities steepen hh 
to intersect low-risk zero profit line before second intersection with indifference curve, creating a third boundary.   18 
intersection of this line and hh as                     for some      .  At h(γ), high-risk types can 
purchase supplemental coverage at the high-risk price to reach h* and are therefore indifferent between 
supplementing         or supplementing h(γ).  It follows, if, by supplementing γ with 
   
          (i.e. 
trading at price 
  
  ), high-risk types can obtain a total policy to the right of hh (i.e. total coverage greater 
than the indemnity  ) ( 1  h of h(γ)), they will strictly prefer γ plus some obtainable pooling derivative to 
       .  For large enough N this is always possible.  We have,    
Lemma 4: Let N* equal the least integer such that 
        
       .  Then, for                  , 
    
   
            . 
 Because of the strict inequality, since consumers can obtain coverage arbitrarily close to  
   
     buying 
each of the N-1 firm's derivatives, the result follows.  See appendix for proof.
  
The  economic  intuition  behind  Lemma  4  requires  the  number  of  firms  not  communicating  and 
selling up to one-Nth the pooling contract be large enough each such firm's market presence is "small."  
Here small is understood in the perfect competition sense and made precise by the condition 
        
     .  
At equilibrium, each firm's largest non-communicated derivative policy (effectively 
        
  ) is smaller 
than any feasible deviation from the equilibrium.  If one of the N firms deviates, its γ offer has a lower 
price (premium per coverage) and greater coverage than the policy 
        
   it effectively withdraws from 
the market.  Since γ more than compensates for the loss of 
        
   all consumers desire γ as part of their 
total coverage.  No firm's market presence is large enough to create a virtual excess demand for pooling 
derivatives by withdrawing its own pooling offer. 
  No communicated γ offer is profitable 
Confirming no firm could earn a positive profit by offering an exclusive, indivisible γ contract with 
client communication requires careful discussion of firm and consumer behaviors at stages two and one 
respectively.  To set this up, we begin with some inferences assumed common knowledge to all agents.   19 
Both high and low-risk agents are rationed at any feasible γ contract and prefer to purchase more 
coverage at the price 
  
   .   Refer to the supplementary pooling coverage demanded by risk type i as 
   
  
           denoted d
i(γ) if no confusion arises.  





    ,  it  will  not  receive  any  client  lists  and  cannot  cancel  contracts  of  consumers 
purchasing supplementary insurance.  However, due to the γ firm's communication strategy, 
any supplementary insurance is at risk of cancellation.  
Remark 7.  Because d
H(γ) > d
L(γ) and both lie on the zero profit pooling line, firms selling both contracts 
sell a disproportionate amount of coverage to high-risk agents and earn negative profit.   
Firm Behavior at Stage Two   
At stage two, each firm selling a pooling contract and in receipt of the list of clients who purchased γ 
must decide which if any of its contracts to cancel.  We discuss optimal firm behavior on each contract. 
Firms offering                        with communication 
  Cancelling contracts of clients who appear on the list of γ clients and present claims greater than 
d
L(γ) is a best response.  It guarantees these firms zero profit and they can do no better.   
 
Informational constraints restrict cancellation to contracts of clients known to have also purchased 
elsewhere; sequential rationality requires only cancelling unprofitable contracts.  Although, firms would 
like to cancel the contract of every client who demonstrably violated exclusivity conditions and submits 
a claim, competition prevents them from earning a positive profit by doing so.  If every firm offering 
these  pooling  contracts  employs  the  bulleted  cancellation  strategy,  a  firm  choosing  the  strategy  of 
unilaterally cancelling contracts of exclusivity violators presenting claims equal to d
L(γ) would attract no 
buyers and therefore would not increase its expected profit.  Alternatively, if any firm deviated and 
honored  contracts  greater  than  d
L(γ)  it  would  attract  every  high-risk  consumer  and  earn  negative 
expected profit.  Moreover, below we show at stage 1 forward-looking consumers of both types who 
desire to purchase γ plus a pooling contract optimize by purchasing d
L(γ) giving firms zero expected 
profits.  The bulleted cancellation strategy is the only sequentially rational strategy for an active firm.   
Firms offering the indivisible         with communication  
  Cancelling contracts of all clients on the γ buyer list who present a claim is a best-response.   20 
 
In the presence of a γ contract, only high-risk types would purchase        , so to avoid negative profit 
firms must cancel contracts of all clients with observable exclusivity violations and presenting a claim.  
An important implication of the last two bullets is no consumer can attain both          and γ. 
Firms offering  
       
  ,           without communication 
  Cancelling contracts of clients appearing on the list of γ clients and presenting claims greater 
than 
     
   is a best response guaranteeing firms zero profit.     
If a communicated γ contract is offered, no consumer not purchasing γ would buy these derivatives 
(such consumers must be high-risk and prefer the primary         offered by the same N firms offering the 
partial derivatives).  Moreover, consumers seeking to supplement  γ have the option of purchasing d
L(γ) from 
one of the n firms offering the full complement of pooling policies with communication.  Therefore, 
neither risk type buying γ would purchase from firms offering one-Nth pooling contracts unless their 
combined availability (given firm cancellation rules) were greater than or equal to d
L(γ).   In the former 
case, firms would expect negative profit because high-risk types would buy a disproportionate amount, 
and in the latter case, they could expect at best zero profit.  If all firms adopt the cancellation strategy of 
cancelling all contracts exceeding 
     
    there are two possibilities for consumers.  If the firm offering γ is 
not one of the N non-communicators, consumers can purchase  ) (
L d by purchasing N contracts.  If the 







will not buy since       is available elsewhere.  In both cases, firms earn zero expected profit, and no 
alternative  cancellation  rule  increases  a  firm's  profit.    A  firm  unilaterally  decreasing  the  size  of  the 
maximum contract it honors would lose its clients.  A firm increasing the size of its maximum honored 
contract could only attract additional high-risk clients insuring above  ) (
L d and bringing negative profit.   
Consumer Behavior at Stage One  
Suppose some firm offers a γ deviation with communication.  At stage 1, consumers’ choice sets 
include γ, the pooling contract and its derivatives, and the high-risk subprime priced policies.  Low-risk 
type's utility maximizing behavior is to purchase γ and  ) (
L d .  They guarantee themselves this allocation 
by obtaining  ) (
L d from a communicating firm selling pooling insurance up to and including         or   21 
by  purchasing  N  partial  contracts 
     
    from  the  firms  offering  up  to  one-Nth           without 
communicating provided there are still N firms offering these partial contracts.  As for high-risk types, we 
have already noted, firms offering the         contract may infer any consumer purchasing it must be 
high-risk  and  will  cancel  the  contract  of  any  client  appearing  on  the  γ  list  and  presenting  a  claim.  
Therefore, if high-risk types purchase         they will not purchase γ depriving sellers of         of an 
exclusivity violation and excuse for cancelling the contract of clients presenting claims at stage two.  This 
means  the  minimum  utility  high-risk  agents  must  receive  is  attained  by  purchasing           and 
supplementing to their equilibrium allocation h* in Figure 1.  If high-risk types find this optimal, only 
low-risk  types  will  purchase  γ  allowing  it  to  earn  positive  expected  profit  upsetting  the  proposed 
equilibrium.  However, high-risk agents are also able to buy γ and supplement it with pooling insurance 
either from one of the communicating firms selling the complete set of pooling contracts or by purchasing 
several pooling derivatives from the non-communicating firms.  The former firms communicate client 
identities to all sellers of pooling contracts.  Therefore, high-risk types can only choose one of these two 
purchase routes.  Moreover, if high-risk agents buying γ reveal their risk type by purchasing       from 
one of the communicating firms offering         and its derivatives, they will see their contracts cancelled 
at stage two should they turn in a claim.  Therefore, if high-risk agents' buying γ purchase from one of the 
communicating firms, their optimal strategy is to mimic low-risk agents and purchase          Through 
similar reasoning, high-risk types may also purchase  ) (
L d  from the firms offering up to one-Nth         
without communicating provided their combined (post cancellation) offering allows them to attain  ) (
L d .  
This  means  high-risk  types  must  choose  between             (possibly  plus  subprime  coverage)  and 
        + subprime coverage.  If the equilibrium is to be sustained, high-risk consumers must prefer to 
mimic low-risk consumers by purchasing γ +      .  
Lemma 5: High risk types strictly prefer purchasing γ +       to       ).   
To show high-risk types strictly prefer to purchase γ +       to purchasing       ), recall any 
prospective γ deviation must lie below the low-risk indifference curve through       ) and on or 
above the budget line (now labeled h) representing the locus of zero profit high-risk contracts 
through h* and       ), see Figure 2.  A consumer can supplement any such γ with pooling 
insurance  (α,  β)  to  obtain  a  total  insurance  policy  on  the  budget  line  through  γ  defined  by 
         
  
            for       .  Low-risk type's total purchase                 maximizes   22 
utility on this budget line, and a low-risk indifference curve is tangent to the budget line at       
For varying γ, the locus of tangency points for parallel budget lines (low-risk type's income-
consumption curve for the constant price 
  
   ) is depicted as AA in Figure 2.  This curve passes 
through         when                                   .  Because    is constant for all γ 
lying on the same budget line, and          and (0,0) are on the same budget line, the curve also 
passes through         when                                    In (α, β) space, constraining β 
to a γ budget line, the income consumption curve is defined implicitly by low-risk type's FOC; 
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   ) shows the 
slope of AA, 
  
      
  
  
 where    equals the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion computed 
for income state i.  Therefore, the income-consumption-curve has a negative slope and must cut the 
positively  sloped  budget  line  labeled  h  through           from  above.    Thus,  for  any  feasible  γ 
contract, the corresponding low-risk type demand point           on AA lies right of the budget 
line labeled h allowing high-risk consumers mimicking the low-risk to supplement           by 
purchasing high-odds insurance up some budget line such as the one labeled    in Figure 2 to a total 
contract preferred to h*.  Since both risk types purchase       and it lies on the zero profit pooling 
line, the firms selling this contract all earn zero expected profit.  But, since the firm selling the lower 
price γ sells to the same proportion of high and low-risk clients as firms selling      , the γ seller 
must earn negative expected profit.  No communicated   deviation breaks the equilibrium.  This 
demonstrates the J configuration is an equilibrium for the two-stage framework.
  
  Features of Proposition 1 are based on the assumption low-risk types most preferred pooling policy 
is positive.  If the optimal pooling policy is the null contract, it follows immediately from Proposition 1: 
Corollary to Proposition 1: Suppose                   then for firm beliefs π = 0, the J configuration 
             described in 1-2 below is a PBE for the two-stage frame. 
1.         firms offer the set of policies                                  with no exclusivity conditions. 
2.  These m firms promise not to communicate their client lists to any firm.   23 
Remark 8: Under the conditions of the corollary, the aggregate set of policies available to consumers is 
still the J-configuration: given this set of policy offers and communication strategies, low-
risk consumers are allocated their optimal pooling policy (      , (thus, buy no insurance) 
while  high-risk  consumers  supplement  (        with  the  full-coverage  contract 
            priced at high-risk fair odds.   
  A recent paper by Laurence Ales and Pricila Maziero (2011) with an interesting discussion of public 
policy implications derived the separating equilibrium of our corollary under the exogenous assumptions 
that low-risk types prefer their endowment to every strictly positive zero profit pooling policy, and firms 
share no client information allowing consumers multiple purchases.    The corollary shows their result is a 
special case of the J configuration.  Once an assumption implying low-risk types will purchase no positive 
pooling  policy  is  made,  equilibrium  with  the  J  configuration  follows  and  firms'  non-communication 
strategies can be derived endogenously and need not be assumed.    
  A related point concerns the nature of strategic communication itself.  Some authors seem to imply it 
means  information  will  be  shared  (but  not  necessarily  unanimously).    But  the  corollary  shows  the 
endogenous flow of information through strategic communication is flexible and depending on underlying 
market  conditions  can  result  in  complete  non-communication  or  a  mix  of  communication  strategies.  
Proposition 1 and its corollary demonstrate conclusively that equilibrium in the adverse selection model is 
strictly a consequence of strategic communication.  Indeed, under conditions inducing all firms not to 
communicate privately held information, although equilibrium still exists, there is a lemon effect and 
Pareto improving trades that would be possible were more information shared do not occur.   
Remark 8:  Although the J configuration is the unique aggregate contract set supporting equilibrium,          
            multiple firm strategy profiles can provide it.   
For example, the N firms offering one-Nth         without communication could be separated from firms 
offering         as an indivisible contract with communication.  
Rules of the Game: Public Versus Private Information 
The adverse selection insurance model founds the notion of imperfect information on the asymmetry 
of  information  about  consumer  risk-types.    Informed  consumers  trade  with  firms  uninformed  about 
consumers' risk type which is therefore private information.  The remaining model determining aspects of 
the information structure was implicitly assumed in R-S-W.  The set of offered contracts, identity of a 
firm's  list  of  clients  (hence  firm's  contract  offer),  and  each  firm's  identical  communication  strategy   24 
divulging  its  clients  to  all  firms  were  each  public  information.    Jaynes  retained  the  informational 
assumptions of R-S-W except for the assumption that a firm's client list should be considered private 
information divulged strategically to other firms only if doing so is profitable.  In his 2-stage game, 
Hellwig  retained  Jaynes'  assumptions  about  the  public/private  classification  of  firm  clients  and 
communication strategies but altered the assumption concerning a firm's contract offer assuming an offer 
could be either private or public information (or in effect with two offers both) at the discretion of the 
firm.  We have shown the assumption firms can offer secret contracts produces a kind of hybrid model 
inducing  features  common  to  two  models,  one  assuming  exogenous  unanimous  communication  and 
exclusivity (R-S-W) the other complete non-communication and unfettered multiple contracting where N 
firms each constrain consumers to one-Nth of the same contract see (Bisin & Guatoli, 2004; Attar and 
Chassagnon, 2009).   Complete non-communication with multiple contracting models assume clients' total 
purchases are unobservable, they do not assume unobservable contracts.  There are good reasons for this.  
The  assumption  a  firm  can  offer  a  secret  contract  involves  the  underlying  model  in  a  logical 
conundrum.    Earlier,  see  footnote  3,  we  suggested  a  firm  offering  both  a  pooling  contract  with  full 
communication (in order to deceive competitors and receive their client lists) and a secret γ contract clearly 
has no intention of selling the pooling contract.  Since the γ contract is chosen to be preferred by low but 
not high risk agents, the firm's pooling contract could only be sold to high-risk types and would earn 
negative profit.  Moreover, since the γ contract is smaller, its positive profit could not cover the losses on 
the pooling contract so the combined profit would also be negative.  Therefore the secret γ deviation also 
adds another implicit assumption, firms may unilaterally refuse to sell agents a contract they are offering.  
Regardless what one thinks of this implied assumption itself, it leads to questioning how reasonable it is to 
assume a competitive firm selling to large numbers of consumers could keep its identity and/or contract 
offers secret from competitors.  Although, suspect too, one might argue low-risk agents who contract for γ 
might have an incentive to keep the firm's offer and identity secret, it is simply not tenable to assume high-
risk agents turned away after refusing the bait and switch γ offer would do so. 
Our view is it is not reasonable to assume the identity of a firm offering a contract is known to would 
be clients turned away and forced to seek other firms, but unknown to those other firms.  Moreover, a firm 
fabricating a pooling offer must also be assumed to either send its competitors either no client information 
or falsified information-- it might plan to send its γ clients' names representing them as purchasers of 
       .  Our view is the assumption of secret contracts should be dropped.  The important contribution of   25 
the sequential structure (unprofitability of a communicated γ contract) does not even require it anyway.  If 
firms are not assumed to be able to offer secret contracts, equilibrium no longer requires there be N firms 
offering partial pooling contracts without communication.  And, the equilibrium is sustained by symmetric 
communication strategies among firms offering the complete set of pooling contracts.   
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Appendix 
Lemma 4: Let N* equal the least integer such that 
        
       .  Then, for                 , 
    
   
            . 
Proof: First observe any potentially profitable γ deviation must be contained within   the set of 
policies bounded by the low risk indifference curve through p* and the hh budget line through h* and p* 
(and possibly a section of the low-risk fair profit line).  We note for every γ properly in ,               
Furthermore, for every such γ, the policy    defined by the greater of the low-risk indifference curve's first 
intersection with the hh budget line or the indifference curve's intersection with the low-risk zero profit line 
satisfies           Now for γ in  let h(γ ) equal the policy defined by the intersection of the budget line hh with 
slope    and the budget line with slope 
  
    through γ, see Figure 2.  Equilibrium requires, for every γ in  , 
   
   
                .  Since the budget line hh has positive slope through           for all  γ,        
         so     
   
       
             is sufficient for the result.    By the hypothesis: 
   
        
        
    
        
    
        
    
    
        
          
        ). 
Then,        leads to same result for any    in  and the conclusion follows. 
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